Start-up financing:a comparative perspective by Korosteleva, Julia & Mickiewicz, Tomasz
13/08/2009 
CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF ECONOMIC AND  
SOCIAL CHANGE IN EUROPE (CSESCE) 
 
 
UCL SSEES 
Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe 
 
 
START-UP FINANCING:  
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
 
Julia Korosteleva and Tomasz Mickiewicz a 
 
 
 
a UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
Email j.korosteleva@ucl.ac.uk; t.mickiewicz@ucl.ac.uk  
 
 
Economics Working Paper No.96 
 
 
December 2008, rev. August 2009 
 
 
 
Centre for the Study of Economic and Social Change in Europe 
UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies 
Gower Street, London,  WC1E 6BT 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7679 8519 
Fax: +44 (0)20 7679 8777 
Email: csesce@ssees.ucl.ac.uk 
1 
 
Start-up Financing: A Comparative Perspective1  
 
Julia Korostelevaa and Tomasz Mickiewiczb 
 
 
 
a Dr Julia Korosteleva, Lecturer in Business Economics, Department of Social 
Science, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London, 16 
Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK; tel.: + 44(0) 20 7679 7590; e-mail: 
j.korosteleva@ucl.ac.uk  (corresponding author) 
 
b Prof. Tomasz Mickiewicz, Professor of Comparative Economics, Department of 
Social Science, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College 
London, 16 Taviton Street, London, WC1H 0BW, UK; tel.: + 44(0) 20 7679 8757; e-mail: 
t.mickiewicz@ucl.ac.uk.  
 
 
Abstract 
We investigate the determinants of start-up financing in 41 countries, using the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor surveys for 1998-20032. High quality of property rights 
increases both the total volume of finance and the use of external finance for the 
individual start-up. The size of the formal financial sector affects the start-up finance via 
enhancing the volume of self-finance. In addition, the use of external finance by start-ups 
correlates with the extent of financial restrictions in a country in a non-linear way. Supply 
of informal finance may to some extent substitute for the use of formal finance. 
 
Keywords: start-up finance, entrepreneurial traits, informal finance, financial 
restrictions, property rights, Global Entrepreneurship Monitor. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The importance of entrepreneurship for economic development has become widely 
acknowledged (Schumpeter 2008 [1934]; Baumol 1990; Wennekers and Thurik 1999; 
Van Stel et al. 2005; Minniti et al. 2005; Minniti and Lévesque 2008)3. Entrepreneurs are 
shown to generate and disseminate innovations and create jobs (Cohen and Klepper 
1992; Audretsch and Thurik 2004; Westhead and Cowling 1995; Acs and Armington 
2004). They fill in market niches, increase competition and consequently promote 
economic efficiency (Minniti et al. 2005). However, entrepreneurs face challenges at the 
start-up. One of the common problems for new ventures is raising sufficient funding 
enabling them to launch and operate businesses successfully. Accordingly, finance 
availability and cost have been cited as one of the major constraints for entrepreneurship 
(Stanworth and Gray 1991; Storey 1994; Beck et al. 2005; 2006; 2008b; OECD 2006). 
The lack of credit history and of credible reputation distinguishes start-ups from 
established firms, creating a disadvantage for the former when it comes to the issue of 
funding (Huyghebaert and Gucht 2007). Given small scale of entrepreneurial projects 
and a higher asymmetry in information and higher risk, financial institutions find it costly 
to monitor small businesses, even if advances in technology (including the risk scoring 
techniques) imply that the banking sector is capable to handle the entrepreneurial 
finance better than in the past (De la Torre et al. 2008). 
The relative difficulty of start-ups in accessing finance is likely to be aggravated by 
a weak business environment, in particular by inadequate legal frameworks and 
underdeveloped financial systems. Given very limited access of entrepreneurs to 
international financial markets, they are particularly sensitive to institutional constraints in 
domestic countries. 
 In this paper, we investigate the determinants of volume and structure of start-up 
finance using the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) 1998-2003 surveys. More 
specifically we examine how the financial environment and property rights system affect 
the volume and sources of entrepreneurial financing at the time of entrepreneurial entry, 
controlling for various individual characteristics of entrepreneurs such as their wealth, 
education, experience and social capital. In particular, our investigation focuses on the 
following issues: 
                                                 
3 See Carree and Thurik (2006) for further references.  
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- While it is well established that the larger financial sectors are beneficial for start-
up financing, it is less understood if this effect works through the direct 
provision of external financing or through enhancing self-finance via savings 
opportunities. 
- Supply of finance to entrepreneurs may be affected not just by the size of the 
formal financial sector but also by the quality of legal system and the extent of 
regulatory control of the financial sector. 
- And finally, informal finance may be either the substitute for formal finance or its 
complement. 
More generally, a comparative advantage of our research can be summarised as 
follows. 
First, in their majority, existing empirical studies focus on firm/entrepreneur-specific 
characteristics including ownership structure and owners’ characteristics (Harris and 
Raviv 1991; Coleman 2000; Cassar 2003; Huyghebaert and Gucht 2007). In addition to 
the aforementioned factors in this research we use institutional country-level indicators. 
This enables us to examine the impact of the business environment on start-up finance, 
a theme not yet explored in the start-up financing literature. Accordingly, along with 
individual GEM data, we use various country-level measures of institutional 
development, comprising a start-up contextual environment. We can safely use this 
aggregate data as our explanatory factors without being concerned with simultaneity 
bias, as the individual decision of a potential entrepreneur does not affect country-level 
institutions or economic development.  
Second, focusing on financial environment allows us to extend the analysis onto 
the supply side of finance. We account for the fact that the entrepreneurial finance is 
determined through the interaction between the firm’s (or entrepreneur’s) preferences for 
certain types of financing and the ability and willingness of external financiers to provide 
the required funding, taking also into account that some firm- (and entrepreneur-) 
specific characteristics provide guidance for external financiers when making their 
financial decisions (De la Torre et al. 2008), so it is difficult to distinguish empirically if 
“banks select businesses, or businesses self-select for finance” (Cressy 1996:1254). 
Yet, while exploring the capital structure of new firms, none of the existing empirical 
studies explicitly focuses on the supply side of finance. We investigate the effect of the 
financial environment using a range of indicators, including the size of both the formal 
and informal financial system, and the institutional and regulatory factors in the financial 
intermediation.  
Third, unlike earlier research we closely look at the impact of the supply of informal 
finance from investors such as family members, friends, work colleagues and informal 
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business angels on the financial size of start-up projects and on the sources of finance 
used. The existing research on informal investment largely looks at the determinants of 
informal investment (Bygrave et al. 2001; Mason 2005) or focuses on the link with the 
opportunity-pulled entrepreneurship (Bygrave et al. 2003).  To our best knowledge, no 
empirical studies exist on effects of informal funding on the start-up financial volume and 
sources and we aim to fill this gap. In addition, we intend to investigate if informal 
finance substitutes or complements the formal financing. 
Fourth, a novel aspect of our research is that we look explicitly at the effect of the 
extent regulations imposed on financial institutions and find that they have a non-
monotonic effect on the use of external finance by start-ups. More specifically, both 
under-regulation of the financial systems and excessive financial restrictions seem to 
affect the start-up finance negatively. 
Fifth, we use the GEM data set that offers a unique opportunity to study nascent 
entrepreneurs (for the definition see Section Three) along with existing businesses. 
While firm finance literature abounds, it is largely centred around the established 
businesses. Limited empirical work has been done on start-up financing due to lack of 
data. As most studies use surveys of existing entrepreneurs, the potential for 
survivorship bias confounding these studies is high (on a similar note see Cassar 2003).  
  The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses some theoretical 
issues pertaining to the start-up finance. We declare some explicit hypotheses to be 
tested. Section Three describes the data and the methodology. Empirical results follow 
in Section Four. Finally, Section Five presents conclusions and policy implications. 
2. Determinants of Start-up Finance 
 
Previous empirical studies on start-up financing show that start-ups typically exhibit 
a moderately low level of formal external financing, largely relying on their own equity 
and informal finance, primarily family and friends’ funds and investment of other 
individuals comprising business angels (Bates 1997; Ravid and Spiegel 1997; 
Huyghebaert 2001; Bygrave 2003). 
In their majority existing empirical studies focus on firm-specific characteristics 
including ownership structure, growth aspirations, and owners’ characteristics as key 
factors determining start-up financial choices. The important role of entrepreneurial 
personal traits, attitude to risk, motivation and cognition have been increasingly 
advocated to explain entrepreneurial entry, decision-making and survival (Parker 2004; 
Arenius and Minniti 2005; Aidis et al. 2007; Aidis et al. 2008a; Ardagna and Lusardi 
2008). More specifically, such socio-demographic features of entrepreneurs as age, 
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gender and work status are shown to be significant determinants of entrepreneurial entry 
(Reynolds et al. 1999; Minniti et al. 2005). Among psychological features, attitude to risk, 
motivation, growth aspirations and self-efficacy are commonly found to play an important 
role for venture growth (Baum and Locke 2004; Aidis and Mickiewicz 2006). We also 
expect these features to shape start-up financing. A number of empirical studies show 
the importance of entrepreneurs’ social capital for accessing external finance (Aldrich et 
al 1987; Coleman 2000; Johanisson 2000).  
On the theoretical ground, empirical studies on start-up financing have been 
mostly motivated by the arguments pertaining to the informational asymmetries theories. 
The central theme in this strand of literature is that in the situation of market 
imperfections, ‘credit rationing’ is likely (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981; Greenwald et al. 
1984)4. However, it is frequently overlooked that the transaction costs associated with 
the informational asymmetry and consequently the potential for credit rationing are 
strongly affected by the cross-country heterogeneity in the financial and legal institutions. 
With the development of the latter, the transactions costs of the financial contract should 
be expected to diminish. Existing comparative research suggests that the institutional 
environment, comprised of formal and informal rules, plays an important role in the 
entrepreneurship development, affecting individuals’ decision to enter entrepreneurship, 
allocation of their effort among its various uses (productive or unproductive), and 
entrepreneurial strategies, including financing and growth (Baumol 1990; Johnson et al. 
2002; Van Stel et al. 2007; Ho and Wong, 2007; Aidis et al 2007, 2008a; Ardagna and 
Lusardi 2008).  
 Based on the institutional theory (North 1990, 1994; Baumol 1990) we distinguish 
the two key institutional dimensions which are more likely to influence financial structure 
of startups: (1) protection of property rights; and (2) financial development, including 
both supply of formal and informal finance, and financial regulatory environment. We 
discuss these dimensions below. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 See Evans and Jovanovic (1989); Holtz-Eakin et al. (1994); Blanchflower and Oswald (1998); 
Hughebaert and Gucht (2007). It is important to note that the credit rationing hypothesis has also 
encountered a great deal of criticism regarding its validity (see Parker 2004 for overview). The 
underlying argument is that the phenomenon of credit rationing is marginal and therefore 
economically insignificant (Berger and Udell 1992; Cressy 1996). Current developments in bank 
technology (risk scoring in particular) seem to alleviate the constraints and current research 
questions the rationale behind government programs that intend to increase lending by 
subsidisation of it (De la Torre et al. 2008). 
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2.1 Protection of Property Rights 
 
Aidis et al. (2007) demonstrate that the property rights system plays a pivotal role, 
being located at the nexus of various other institutional indicators. Their results are 
consistent with Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who see protection of property rights 
from expropriation as the key institutional dimension which they interpret in a narrow 
sense, as distinguished from the ‘contracting institutions’. Typically, the economic agents 
can overcome obstacles and deficiencies in ‘contacting institutions’ by changing the 
preferred form of contractual arrangements and developing private contracting systems. 
In contrast, instability of core property rights has a more fundamental negative effect on 
economic activity. In an environment with weak protection of property rights, financial 
contracts are less likely to be concluded, leading to the underdevelopment of finance 
(Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; see also: Johnson et al. 2002). Relational lending tends 
to dominate in finance, and that has a negative effect on provision of credit to small 
enterprises and start-ups (De la Torre et al. 2008). Based on what we have said, our first 
hypothesis is formulated as follows. 
 
H1: Weak property rights are likely to discourage financiers both formal and 
informal, limiting an entrepreneur’s access to external finance and as a result also the 
total volume of finance available for an individual start-up project.  
 
2.2 Financial Development and Financial Regulation 
 
 Along with a well-functioning property rights system, developed financial 
institutions have been argued to play an important role in enhancing the level of 
entrepreneurial activity (Aidis et al. 2008a) and in firm’s growth (Beck 2005 et al.). 
Financial intermediaries facilitate the risk amelioration in the presence of problems 
created by information and transaction frictions, by developing expertise in risk 
assessment and in monitoring (Levine 1997; Barth et al. 2006; De la Torre et al. 2008). 
Parallel to this, the financial sector affects firm financing through the wider allocation of 
savings towards potential investment projects (Levine et al. 1999). Developed financial 
institutions are found to be particularly beneficial for small firms compared to large ones 
(Barth et al. 2006; Beck et al. 2005; 2006; 2008b). The same should apply even more to 
start-ups. Accordingly, the size of the formal financial system is expected to be positively 
related to the use of external financing, as a better functioning financial system should 
ease up borrowing constraints.  
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Moreover, the startup context-specific constraints in accessing external finance 
can be mitigated through the process of capital accumulation (Parker 2000; Webb and 
de Meza 2001). More specifically, Parker (2000)5 suggests that when start-ups 
experience liquidity constraints, a stronger incentive to finance a venture increases the 
savings rate of potential entrepreneurs. In this way, a developed financial system may 
alleviate liquidity constraints through facilitating accumulation of entrepreneurs’ savings 
(Webb and de Meza 2001). Additionally, financial development may contribute further to 
capital accumulation through offering a more competitive deposit rate as well as 
reducing the lending interest rate and consequently an overall debt burden on 
individuals, allowing for a further increase in savings accumulation. This leads us to 
formulate our next hypothesis. 
 
H2: A more developed formal financial sector implies more opportunities to 
accumulate savings and therefore more own funds for entrepreneurial projects. 
 
Financial regulation remains at the centre of policy-oriented economic debate. 
While it appears that regulatory focus on supporting transparency, on access to 
information and on enhancing market-based monitoring has been clearly beneficial, the 
scope of financial restrictions and the scope and discretion of the direct supervisory 
oversight is a far more controversial issue, with emerging empirical evidence of some 
negative effects, including both lower financial efficiency and higher likelihood of 
financial crises. These negative effects may be seen as either unintended (public 
interest view) or as a by-product of regulatory capture by special interests within the 
financial sector (venal corruption) and/or by political interests imposed from above 
(systemic corruption) (Barth et al. 2006; 2008). 
  Consistent with this, Jappeli and Pagano (1994) argue that heterogeneity in 
liquidity constraints across countries is largely attributed to the regulation of the financial 
sector.  Excessive financial restrictions are likely to lead to financial disintermediation 
(McKinnon 1993; Fry 1997; Korosteleva and Lawson forthcoming 2010). This may have 
further adverse consequences for new firms. Burdensome financial regulation is seen to 
be inefficient, empowering governmental officials, fuelling corruption and benefiting 
incumbent firms, including in the financial sector, the most (Barth et al. 2008). Typically, 
in developing countries in particular, excessive financial restrictions are associated with 
growing share of direct state majority ownership of banks. State banks are likely to 
                                                 
5 However, Parker (2000) recognises that not all individuals will be able to accumulate savings; 
some of them may be too poor to save enough.  
8 
 
prioritise state owned firms and discriminate against the entrepreneurs in their lending 
policies (De la Torre et al. 2008). 
However, in turn, under-regulated financial sectors are also unlikely to benefit 
startups. Free banking may encourage risk-taking by banks, prompting them to move 
away from lending to the real sector in search of higher returns, creating a moral hazard 
problem for the government. This risky-type behaviour may generate financial fragility 
and increase the probability of financial crises with further recessionary consequences 
for businesses (Ranciere et al. 2006).  
In unregulated financial environment banks are more likely to exercise their market 
power and behave as monopolists, setting higher margins (Barth et al. 2008). In many 
developing countries the banking industry is dominated by a small number of banks and 
collusive behaviour is not uncommon. Demetriades and Luintel (2001) argue that there 
is an inverse relationship between the degree of state control over the banking system 
and the ability of the banking system to operate as a profit-maximizing cartel. They find 
that mild repression of loan rates, with a lending rate ceiling above the competitive 
market rate, but below the monopolistic profit-maximizing rate, may increase the volume 
of loans and deposits in developing countries, as exemplified by South Korea. At the 
same time they find that if severe financial repression takes place (the lending rate 
ceiling is lower than the competitive market rate), it will have a negative impact on 
financial development (as exemplified by India; see Demetriades and Luintel 1997).  
This implies a possible non-monotonic relationship between financial restrictions 
and availability of finance for start-ups. Accordingly, we postulate that some degree of 
financial restrictions may imply lower interest margins and respectively lower cost of 
finance for entrepreneurs and more opportunities for start-up finance. However, at the 
same time we posit that overrestricted banking sectors may offer less start-up finance. 
Consequently, our next hypotheses are formulated as follows:  
 
H3: (H3a) Some degree of financial restrictions may imply increase in the use of 
external finance and more start-up finance. (H3b) However, with more extensive 
financial restrictions, its effect may become negative, reflecting financial repression and 
resulting in less start-up finance being available. 
 
Informal finance comprised of family and friends’ funds and investment of private 
business angels is also very important for start-ups. The total amount of money provided 
by informal investors accounted for one and a half per cent of the combined GDP of the 
41 GEM nations. This is comparable with the amount of personal funding provided by 
GEM entrepreneurs (2.4 per cent of GDP). In contrast, formal venture capitalists 
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invested only six per cent of the total informal investment in 2006 (Bygrave and Quill 
2007:5). Thus our next hypothesis should read as follows.  
 
H4: The size of the informal financial sector is of significant importance to 
entrepreneurs in providing external funding in the early-stage of entrepreneurial activity.  
 
2.3 Controls: Entrepreneurial Traits and Start-up Characteristics 
 
 In our analysis we distinguish between socio-economic characteristics of 
entrepreneurs (age, gender, working experience, availability of financial resources) and 
personal cognitive features (self-efficacy, growth aspirations, motivation, and risk 
attitude).  
A number of studies show positive relationship between availability of financial 
resources and entrepreneurial entry (Reynolds et al. 1999, Minniti et al. 2005). While 
investigating the link between aggregate wealth and the average self-employment rate, 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989)6 find the significant effects of wealth, implying that liquidity 
constraints are binding. While this is one obvious reason why we expect wealthier 
entrepreneurs to go for larger scale projects, another important factor here is that 
personal wealth affects risk-tolerance positively (Hall and Woodward 2008). In addition, 
for wealthy individuals, the external funding may come on better terms (availability of a 
collateral, etc.), making it more attractive for those who are relatively better off in terms 
of income and wealth. 
The modern entrepreneurship theory emphasizes the importance of self-efficacy of 
individuals for entering entrepreneurship and for success of their businesses. Self-
efficacy may be enhanced through social learning (Harper 2003).  Being embedded in 
various business networks is one example of how this may occur (Minniti et al. 2005). 
Minniti et al. (2005) looks at role models from the perspective of entrepreneurs’ mindset, 
arguing that role models are likely to shape individual perceptions about the 
entrepreneurial environment and generate more positive attitudes.  Business networks 
gain particular importance for entrepreneurship when formal structures fail to function 
adequately. Network capital is regarded as an entrepreneur’s intangible asset that can 
be used to overcome difficulties arising from failure of formal institutions. Previous 
studies show that social networks facilitate entrepreneurs’ access to finance (Aldrich et 
al 1987; Johanisson 2003). 
                                                 
6 However, Parker (2004) points to some limitations of Evans and Jovanovic’s (1989) study and, 
drawing on other research, offers possible alternative explanations for their findings.  
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Start-ups with higher growth aspirations, appear as more attractive to external 
financiers, not just because of the higher expected returns, but also because the modern 
banking sector derives its start-ups related profits not just (and not primarily) from direct 
lending, but also from offering a wider range of financial services, including servicing 
personal accounts of prospective employees of a new business (De la Torre et al. 2008). 
Thus, profit opportunities for the providers of finance are closely related to the size of a 
new project.  
 Finally, we also expect start-up ownership structure to affect both the 
entrepreneurs’ access to external finance and the overall size of entrepreneurial project. 
We include the variable that identifies start-ups with more than one owner. Start-up 
ownership tends to be highly concentrated and there is rarely separation between 
ownership and control. A positive effect of having business partners at the time of the 
start-up (resource-based view) may be similar to the network effect discussed above: 
additional business partners enhance network capital of the new venture. 
 While these are our main control variables, in our study we also introduce other 
individual characteristics and mention their likely effects in Section Three. The next 
section describes our data and methodology.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1 Sample 
To explore the determinants of the financial structure of business start-ups, we use 
the data collected through the GEM adult population surveys in 1998-2003, covering 41 
countries worldwide7. The data consists of representative samples of at least 2,000 
individuals in each country, drawn from the working age population. GEM surveys were 
completed through phone calls and through face-to-face interviews in countries, where 
low density of the telephone network could create a bias. National datasets are 
harmonised across these countries8.  
GEM data distinguishes between (i) people with the intention to start a business, 
(ii) nascent entrepreneurs (who are already in a process of establishing a new firm, also 
labelled start-ups) and (iii) currently operating young firms (under three and a half 
years)9. While the dataset provides information on a whole range of businesses, for the 
purpose of this study we will focus on start-ups only. This is a category, where initial 
                                                 
7 For countries included into the 1998-2003 datasets and year coverage see Reynolds et al. 
(2005).  
8 For more details of the sampling procedure see Reynolds et al. (2005, 2008). 
9 Along with these two last categories, reflecting total entrepreneurial activity, GEM also identifies 
established businesses (more than three and a half years old) (Reynolds et al. 2005). 
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entrepreneurial financing decisions may be captured best, without being affected by a 
subsequent development of individual businesses. Start-ups or nascent entrepreneurs 
are, according to GEM criteria, defined as individuals between 18-64 years old, showing 
some action towards setting up a new business whether fully or partly owned. They also 
must not yet have paid any wages or salaries for more than three months. This definition 
is summarised in Figure One.  
The following sub-section discusses variable definitions and measurements in 
more detail.   
 
3.2 Variables: Definitions and Measurement 
There is no universally accepted set of measures of institutional quality. In their 
majority researchers have used what is commonly referred to as institutional outcome 
variables (Glaeser et al. 2004). The commonly used measures include survey indicators 
provided by the International Country Risk Guide (e.g. a measure of risk of 
expropriation), those provided by the World Bank Governance project (measures of 
governance effectiveness); the World Bank’s Doing Business survey; and the Heritage 
Foundation – Wall Street Journal “Economic Freedom” database.  
The question of the adequacy of these various measures of institutional quality has 
been material for continuous academic debates. In reality, there is a continuum between 
the long-term stable institutional arrangements and short-term government policies, and 
delimiting the two in an exact way is conceptually difficult (Glaeser et al. 2004). The 
expectations of the economic actors about durability of given policies, laws on books and 
administrative practice play a critical role, and identifying a priori the empirical 
characteristics of institutional and policy setup which is conducive to economic 
development and affects entrepreneurs’ decision-making is not easy.  
One of the indicators, commonly used by scholars (Acemoglu and Johnson 2005; 
Aidis et al. 2007) is the Heritage Foundation index of property rights. The Heritage 
Foundation ‘property rights’ indicator shows the degree of protection of individuals’ 
private property rights by law on books and through its enforcement, and the extent to 
which private property is protected from expropriation (Beach and Kane 2008). The 
score ranges from zero meaning poor law protection and enforcement to 100 per cent, 
when property rights are fully guaranteed by the government and the contract 
enforcement is strong. We transform this index of property rights into odds10 to get a 
                                                 
10 To calculate odds (logistic transformation) we use the following formula: [Index / (100 – Index)]. 
Note that the highest value of the Heritage Foundation index in our sample is 90, which implies 
the maximum observed value of the transformed variable at nine. 
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measure of the ‘property rights’ constraints, which has better distributional 
characteristics11.  
To measure the availability of formal finance we use the ratio of domestic credit to 
private sector to GDP, obtained from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
This measure has been used in previous studies on entrepreneurship (Klapper et al. 
2006; Aidis et al. 2007), has wide coverage and correlates well with other measures of 
financial development (Beck et al. 2008a).   
To measure the extent of financial restrictions we use a transformed indicator of 
financial freedom from the Heritage Foundation database. The financial freedom index 
measures the extent of restrictions imposed on financial activities and on entry, i.e. the 
state intervention in the national financial system, which goes beyond the prudential 
supervision and informational, transparency and audit requirements. In addition, the low 
values of the financial freedom index indicate direct state influence on the allocation of 
finance, including state ownership of financial institutions (Beach and Kane 2008). 
Again, we transform the original index of financial freedom into odds to get a better proxy 
for constraints and reverse the ordering.12 We label the transformed variable ‘financial 
restrictions index’. Furthermore, we also introduce a square term, checking for 
nonlinearity in its impact on entrepreneurial finance in line with the argument presented 
in the previous section.  
We introduce the prevalence rate of informal investors, which proxies for the 
supply of informal funds that can be used for start-up capital. It is derived from our GEM 
data by taking the average percentage of respondents who invested in someone else’s 
start-up in the past three years in each country-year sub-sample. 
 Finally, we use the GEM-defined variables to represent wealthier individuals, 
network capital, growth aspirations13 and business ownership. More specifically, we use 
a dummy variable with ‘one’ denoting those individuals whose income is high according 
to their perceptions. We aim to capture social network effects by introducing a dummy 
variable which shows if the nascent entrepreneur knows some other entrepreneurs.  In 
addition, we introduce a dummy representing an owner of any other existing businesses. 
                                                 
11 In fact, we experimented with both using the original index and a dummy variable denoting 
strong property rights. The results are unaffected. 
12 Similar to property rights indicator, we transform the original indicator using the following 
formula: [(100-Index) / Index]. Note the reversal of order so that the transformed index measures 
the extent of financial restrictions. 
13 The traditional set of explanatory variables used for small enterprises also includes firm size, 
proxied either by a firm’s total assets or employment size. While our data set contains information 
on start-up employment, this is strongly correlated with actual stage of the entrepreneurial entry 
(as hiring new employees is a gradual process) and a large number of missing values reduces 
our sample size drastically. More information is available on the planned size of employment, 
which in our context is a better proxy for the start-up size. 
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This captures both network effects and individual entrepreneurial experience 
(Wennekers’s et. al. 2005). To measure the effects of start-up growth aspirations we 
introduce a dummy variable to identify entrepreneurs who expect to create more than 
one job in five years time. To examine the effects of the ownership structure variable we 
use a dummy that identifies start-ups with more than one owner (see Table One). 
We have a number of dependent variables to reflect various financial outcomes. 
First, we introduce a dummy variable coded as ‘one’ to identify entrepreneurs who rely 
on external finance, and zero otherwise. Second, we also introduce a share of external 
finance as a proportion of total funds of a start-up. Third, we look at the volume of 
individual start-up finance, both total finance and the amount of own finance and external 
finance. The volume of own finance is calculated as the difference between total and 
external finance reported. We take the GEM data for both expressed in local currencies 
and scale them by dividing by the nominal per capita GDP also expressed in local 
currencies to get cross-country compatible data.  
Finally, we use additional measures identifying a use of a particular type of 
external financing including: (i) use of external funding other than family (friends and 
colleagues plus institutional providers of finance); (ii) use of external funding from 
individuals (friends, colleagues and family); (iii) use of external institutional funding 
(financial institutions, banks in particular). For further details regarding definitions and 
descriptive statistics of dependent variables, as well as the correlation matrix for 
institutional and macroeconomic variables see respectively Tables Two and Three.  
 
3.3 Control variables 
In addition, the set of explanatory variables includes the following.  
Our macroeconomic development indicators are represented by per capita GDP 
(at purchasing power parity), as a number of scholars acknowledge that it links with 
entrepreneurial (Carree et al. 2002, Wennekers et al. 2005). For our sample, we found 
that a nonlinear albeit monotonic transformation of GDP per capita (purchasing power 
parity) into natural logarithm fits data best. Alternatively, we also introduced per capita 
GDP squared test for non-monotonicity, but failed to provide any supporting evidence for 
this.  As far as start-up financing is concerned, or prior expectations has been to find a 
positive relationship between per capita GDP and the use of external finance as well as 
with the project scale.   
We also introduce the GDP annual growth rate to reflect a cyclical economic 
performance.  We expect that at the period of recessions when the financial sector 
contracts entrepreneurs rely more on their own funds or informal investments from their 
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family and friends. Furthermore, a project is more likely to be small in scale and 
therefore capital requirements are likely to be lower.  
 Our research is also intended to provide some insights into the effects of various 
personal characteristics on start-up financial choices. Apart from personal financial 
resources, other entrepreneurs’ personal characteristics, such as age, gender and 
education and work status emerge as significant determinants in entrepreneurs’ 
decision-making. Previous GEM studies suggest that middle-aged, working males with 
higher educational attainment are more likely to start a business (Minnitti et al. 2005). 
Previous research indicates that some aspects of entrepreneurs’ financial decision-
making, in particular capital purchases, is a quadratic function of the entrepreneur’s age 
(Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994).  Non-linearity of age has also been shown in relation to 
entrepreneurship entry (Levesque and Minniti 2006, Aidis et al. 2007). We introduce age 
squared to test this non-linearity assumption.  
 We also introduce an indicator of entrepreneurs’ risk attitude. Risk aversion is 
shown to be a significant predictor of entrepreneurial entry and types of entrepreneurial 
activity (Arenius and Minniti 2005; Ardagna and Lusardi 2008). Similarly to Arenius and 
Minniti (2005) we utilise GEM-defined indicator of perceived fear of failure as a 
subjective measure of attitude to risk. In our study we also control directly for a declared 
motive for entrepreneurial entry distinguishing between the opportunity and necessity-
driven entrepreneurs. Finally, we introduce a dummy variable denoting some individual 
experience of being a business angel in the past that is expected to be positively 
associated with the use of external funding and the overall financial scale of the new 
project.   
 
3.4 Methodology 
 
For the robustness of our results we use a number of estimators, including probit, 
tobit and robust regression estimators. Initially, we applied the Heckman selection 
model, also known as the tobit II model, which allows dealing with a sample selection, 
while using the full survey information, to verify if we can run the finance model 
independently from the equation determining the decision to entry. The model 
determines simultaneously the likelihood of entrepreneurship entry and start-up financial 
outcomes captured by an indicator of use of external financing, using a maximum 
likelihood method.  Accordingly, it consists of two parts: the outcome equation, 
identifying the binary financing outcome (use of external finance or lack of it), and the 
selection equation, describing the binary choice of entrepreneurship entry. The specific 
parameter of a Heckman specification is the correlation coefficient between the two error 
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terms. We did not find it statistically different from zero, which implies we may estimate 
our financial choice equation by using a probit model. Accordingly, we focus on a probit 
regression and report the marginal effects for the use of start-up financing (Table 
Four)14.   
We also use a bivariate probit, tobit and robust regression estimations while 
investigating the determinants of different types of external financing (of share of 
external finance in Table Five, of volume of total financing and of own financing in Table 
Six, a joint estimation of individual and institutional sources of financing in Table Seven, 
and of non-family and family financing and of institutional and noninstitutional financing 
in Table Eight). Our motivation to apply the tobit models is to account for a situation 
where our dependent financing variables are continuous, but their range is constrained 
with a substantial number of observations equal to zero, denoting those who do not use 
external finance; other observations are positive and may produce many different 
outcomes (Verbeek 2000). And, for the robustness of our results, for the continuous 
variables with no limits (amount of total funding and amount of personal funding) we also 
account for the fact that the results may be sensitive to the presence of outliers by 
employing the robust regression estimation technique as programmed in the STATA 
software15 (see Table Six).  
   In the next section we discuss our empirical results. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
The results of the probit specification (Table Four) indicate clearly that strong 
protection of property rights is conducive to the use of external finance.  
The impact of this variable dominates any other institutional or macro variable we 
use. Furthermore, our analysis of the marginal effects suggests that varying the strength 
of property rights from its sample minimum of 0.42 to its sample maximum nine 
(respectively 30 and 90 per cent in terms of the Index of Property Rights), increases the 
predicted probability of the use of external financing by start-ups by 25 per cent (from .36 
to .61). In our sample only China and Russia score as low as 30 per cent, implying that 
property ownership is weakly protected16. US, Germany and the UK emerge at the other 
                                                 
14 The results of the Heckman specification model can be obtained from the authors upon the 
request. 
15 The model is first estimated by OLS regression to calculate the Cook’s distance which is used 
to eliminate outliers if the Cook’s distance exceeds 1. Afterwards, iterations are performed based 
on Huber weights and followed by iterations based on a biweght function (Jappelli and Pagano 
1994).  
16 See however some discussion by Rodrik (2000:13) who argues that some characteristics of 
property rights in China make them stronger.    
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end of the continuum, whereas other major developed economies such as Japan, 
France and Italy score lower. 
 Results reported in Tables Five-Six reveal that weak property rights tend not only 
to discourage financiers, but also diminish the share of external finance as well as 
decrease an overall scale of project.  
Consistently across all estimations, one can clearly see a strong positive 
association of the size of the financial sector with the entrepreneurial choice of self-
finance as compared with external finance. This evidently supports our hypothesis two. 
The wider financial sector provides more opportunities for (potential) entrepreneurs to 
accumulate savings to be subsequently used for business formation.  
In addition, the results of the robust regression (see Table Six) also suggest a 
strong positive association between the size of the financial sector and the financial 
scale of the start-up project.  
Interestingly, we find a bell-shaped relationship between the extent of financial 
restrictions and the choice of external funding, suggesting a positive relationship 
between the two up to the threshold of 1.18 and its reversal beyond the turning point17. 
In our sample Argentina, China, India and Russia appear to score below this threshold, 
implying that the financial restrictions affect start-up access to external finance in a 
negative way there.   Moreover, we find that the increase in financial restrictions beyond 
the turning point has more pronounced effects on predicted probability as compared 
when the restrictions are increased up to the threshold. More specifically, strengthening 
of the regulatory regime of the financial sector from 0.11 to 1.1818 raises the likelihood of 
the use of external finance by six per cent whereas it drops by 15 per cent when the 
regulation is strengthened from 1.18 to four19. We also test for the strength of this 
relationship with and without controlling for the size of the financial sector, and we find 
that both a non-monotonicity assumption and the strength of the relationship are robust 
under any of the two specifications. Respectively, these findings support both of our 
hypotheses: (H3a) and (H3b), albeit the (negative) impact of high level of restrictions 
appears stronger, as the square of financial regulation enters the regression more 
significantly, suggesting that rigid financial regulation has more pronounced effects on 
                                                 
17 The calculations of the turning point are based on the results of probit regression presented in 
Table Five. This turning point corresponds to the score of 46 per cent in terms of the Heritage 
Foundation Index of Financial Freedom.     
18 These are respectively equivalent to the scores of 90 and 46 per cent in terms of the Heritage 
Foundation Index of Financial Freedom. The change in predicted probability for a change of δ in 
FinReg (holding all other variables fixed) is equal to Pr(Y=1|X, FinReg + δ ) – Pr(Y=1|X, FinReg). 
19 These are respectively equivalent to the scores of 46 and 20 per cent in terms of the Heritage 
Foundation Index of Financial Freedom. 
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entrepreneurial financial decision-making and consequently on start-ups’ liquidity 
constraints. 
We test the robustness of these findings using alternative specifications such as 
tobit and robust regression models (see Tables Five-Six). The results are robust for 
alternative measures of entrepreneurs’ financing sources, including our dichotomous 
variable identifying access to external funding (see Table Five) and the share of external 
funds in total funds (see Table Six). Expecting some possible multicollinearity between 
financial development and per capita GDP, we also test these results with and without 
controlling for per capita GDP. The direction and magnitude of these relationships 
change marginally when we do not control for per capita GDP.   
Our other findings, based on the estimation of probit and tobit regressions, suggest 
that the size of the informal financial sector is statistically significantly and positively 
associated with the entrepreneurial choice of external finance as compared with 
personal finance. We interpret this result as an indication of the pecking order in 
financing choices, redefined to distinguish between formal and informal finance. The 
latter is more attractive to the entrepreneur as it is characterised by a lower informational 
asymmetry and therefore more likely to be offered and at lower cost.  
Figure 2 shows a significant cross-country variation in terms of the availability of 
formal vis-a-vis informal finance with most developing countries typically exhibiting both 
the low size of the formal financial sector and lower prevalence rates of informal finance.  
Uganda emerges as an outlier, demonstrating the highest rate of the prevalence of 
informal funding. Amongst other developing countries Mexico also exhibits relatively high 
level of informal finance that is comparable to the one in China and Thailand. Figure 2 
suggest that both should be used as substitutes not the complements as there is no 
correlation between the supply of formal and informal finance. 
We noted before that China and Russia are characterised by both weak formal 
property rights and financial oppression. Both factors should imply little use of external 
finance by entrepreneurs. However, China is one of the five countries in our sample with 
the widest availability of informal finance (about six per cent prevalence rate, see Figure 
2; the value of informal capital in China has been estimated to vary between two-five per 
cent of GDP in early 2000s by Smallbone and Jianzhong 2008). This is likely to 
counterbalance the negative effects of the other two factors. It is interesting to note that 
while among informal investors the family was traditionally assigned a critical role in 
financing entrepreneurial ventures in China, the most recent study (Au and Kwan 2009) 
overrides this conventional belief, suggesting that the seeking of initial funding from the 
family only occurs when entrepreneurs expect lower transaction costs and lower levels 
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of family interference in the business. In the fear of family interference Chinese 
entrepreneurs tend to seek initial capital from friends rather from their family.  
In contrast, availability of external informal finance in Russia is much lower 
(between one-two per cent prevalence rate). A number of other transition countries in 
our sample are characterised by similar lower level of supply of informal finance, 
including Croatia and Poland. Poland experienced a boom in entrepreneurship in early 
1990s, but these, to a significant extent, were low-capital intensive ventures, taking 
advantage of market gaps inherited from the command economy sector. Later on, 
financial constraints were likely to be one of the factors that led to the lower rates of 
entrepreneurial entry. 
Our results also suggest that personal wealth emerges as a significant predictor of 
the use of both internal and external finance and the overall financial scale of the project, 
implying that wealthier people are more likely to start larger ventures. Our findings 
conform to Evans and Jovanovic’s (1989) argument that liquidity constraints are binding. 
Entrepreneurs’ growth aspirations and ownership structure (more than one business 
partner) appear among other statistically significant predictors of the use and size of 
external financing. Entrepreneurs’ socio-economic characteristics, such as age and 
gender emerge consistently as strong predictors of the characteristics of a start-up 
financing. Age exhibits a non-linear relationship with the use of external finance, 
suggesting that while young entrepreneurs are more likely to rely more on external funds 
to launch their business, the use of external funding declines with age as individuals 
tend to accumulate savings to be invested into the business. However, beyond a certain 
age point this pattern is reversed with more mature entrepreneurs becoming larger users 
of external financing. By that time they are likely to have some established reputation 
with their bank that may ease up their access to credit.  
Males are more likely to use external finance, as well as to go for larger projects 
and are more likely to invest their own money. This finding extends some previous 
studies of the role of gender in entrepreneurship (Minitti et al. 2005, Aidis et al. 2007).  
Overall however, our results on personal characteristics contrast to some extent 
with Cassar’s (2003) findings, suggesting that entrepreneurial individual characteristics, 
such as education, experience and gender, don’t exert a significant effect upon start-up 
financing when firm characteristics are taken into consideration. 
Last but not least, an opportunity motive and being a business angel in the past 
appear to be strongly and positively associated with the overall financial size of the 
project. The effect of risk attitude seems to be not robust, being picked up only in our 
probit estimation.  
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 Unlike our expectations, we fail to find any significant effects of entrepreneurial 
embeddeness in social networks and of the role models on the startup financial 
characteristics.  
 Though variation in industrial structure is found to be significant in explaining 
entrepreneurship entry (Johnson 2004) and industrial controls are commonly utilised in 
examining entrepreneurs’ financial preferences (Cassar 2003), we failed to find any 
significant effects of the sector of entry in our research (results available on request). We 
also fail to find any robust effects of our two macroeconomic control variables. 
Finally, as an additional robustness check, Tables Seven-Eight report the results of 
probit regressions for various sources of external financing.  We find that a wider formal 
financial sector is negatively correlated with the choice of external funding (both 
institutional and individual); that reiterates our earlier argument on significance of the 
formal financial sector for the personal capital accumulation. Strong property rights are 
more conducive to the use of institutional finance. Finally, growth aspirations, personal 
wealth and presence of co-owners emerge as significant predictors of the use of informal 
finance.  
 
5. Conclusions 
  
Our key results may be summarized as follows.  
 Consistent with the literature we see the protection of property rights as the core 
of any institutional environment. It is the main factor affecting the presence and volume 
of external finance for new ventures and as a result also the main driver of the overall 
volume of finance used for a start-up.  
The only type of external finance that does not respond to the variation in property 
rights system is finance from family and relatives (Table Eight). That is to some extent, 
the formal legal structure and practice may be substituted with informal institutions and 
relational capital. China seems to be a good example here.  
In sharp contrast, poor protection of property rights discourages both non-family 
individuals and institutional providers of finance (including banks) to provide funds to 
new entrepreneurial ventures. 
Our second set of results relate to the characteristics of the financial sector. The 
financial sector development is only partly correlated with the basic protection of 
property rights, as it links more with the features of ‘contracting institutions’, using a 
terminology introduced by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005). Therefore, its impact may be 
considered on its own. Our findings suggest that the large financial sector plays an 
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important role mainly via providing opportunities for the accumulation of personal finance 
for the potential entrepreneurial projects.  
Regarding financial regulation, we found that both regimes which are under-
regulated, and, even more, those that are over-restrictive discourage finance for start-
ups, which is by its nature risky and demanding. Underregulated regimes may be 
associated with monopolistic practices in the banking sector and insufficient competition. 
In turn, overregulated regimes may drive banks away from more risky projects, which 
include start-ups, or benefit incumbent firms in countries where the level of corruption is 
high. 
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Figure 1: GEM Classification of Nascent Entrepreneurial Activity (Startups) 
  
Currently setting up 
a business, 
individually? 
Currently setting up 
a business, 
sponsored? 
Active in the past 12 months? 
Yes/DK Yes/DK
Owner or part-owner? 
      Yes
     Yes
Business paid wages etc. last 3 months? 
Nascent entrepreneur: Involved in setting 
up a business 
       No 
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Figure 2: The Availability of the Formal vis-a-vis Informal Finance: a Cross-
Country Comparison20  
 
 
Source: GEM 1998-2003 
Note: The rate of informal finance prevalence is derived as the average percentage of 
respondents who invested in someone else’s start-up in the past three years in each 
country sub-sample.  
Source: GEM 1998-2003 
                                                 
20 Country abbreviations should be read as follows. AR –Argentina, AU –Australia, BE-Belgium, BR –
Brazil, CA – Canada, CH – China, CL – Chile, DE – Germany, DK – Denmark, ES- Spain, FI – Finland, 
FR – France, GR – Greece, HK – Hong Kong, HR – Croatia, HU – Hungary, IE- Ireland, IL – Israel, IN – 
India, IS- Island, IT – Italy, JP – Japan, KR – South Korea, MX – Mexico, NL – Netherlands, NO – 
Norway, NZ – New Zealand,  PL – Poland, PT – Portugal, RU – Russia, SE – Sweden, SG – Singapore, SI 
– Slovenia, SW – Switzerland, TH – Thailand, TW – Taiwan, UG – Uganda, UK  - United Kingdom, US- 
United States, VE – Venezuela, ZA – South Africa.    
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and definitions of explanatory variables 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. No of obs Available 
for years 
Business environment variables: 
Property rights Heritage Foundation 
‘Property Rights’ index, 
transformed in odds 
[Index/(100-Index)]; higher 
value denotes stronger 
property rights 
6.46 3.55 358,278 1998-
2003 
Formal finance 
as % of GDP 
Ratio of credit to private 
sector to GDP (WB WDI)  
108.6 49.05 358,278 1998-
2003 
Informal 
finance 
prevalence 
Informal investors 
prevalence 
2.67 1.68 358,278 1998-
2003 
Business 
constraints 
Heritage Foundation 
‘Business Freedom’ index, 
transformed into odds 
[(100- Index)/Index]; 
higher value denotes 
higher entry barriers 
0.33 .20 358,278 1998-
2003 
Financial 
restrictions 
Transformed Heritage 
Foundation ‘Financial 
Freedom’ index, 
transformed in odds  
[(100-FFI)/FFI] 
.62 .55 358,278 1998-
2003 
Financial 
restrictions 
squared 
Financial restrictions 
squared 
  358,278 1998-
2003 
Personal characteristics: 
Male 1=male, zero otherwise .47 .50 358,275 1998-
2003 
Age The exact age of the 
respondent at time of 
interview 
43.87 17.00 326,487 
Age squared Age squared   326,487 
 
1998; 
2000-
2003 
Employment 1=respondent is either 
in full or part time 
employment, 0  if not 
.58 .49 317,649 1999-
2003 
Post-secondary & 
higher education 
1=respondent has a 
post secondary or 
higher education 
attainment, 0 otherwise 
.65 .48 347,746 1999-
2003 
Higher education 1=respondent has a 
higher education 
attainment 
.29 .46 347,746 1999-
2003 
Current owner of 
business 
1=current 
owner/manager of 
business, 0 otherwise 
.05 .22 342839 2000-
2003 
Business angel 1=business angel in 
past three years, 0 
otherwise 
.03 .16 357,773 1998-
2003 
Fear of failure 1=respondent believes 
that the fear of failure 
.31 .46 299,674 2000-
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would not prevent 
him/her from starting a 
business, 0 otherwise 
2003 
Knows other 
entrepreneurs 
1=personally knows 
entrepreneurs in past 
two years, zero if not  
.33 .47 299,682 2000-
2003 
Opportunity 
motivation 
1=nascent 
entrepreneur is driven 
by an opportunity 
motive, zero otherwise 
.75 .43 10,081 2002-
2003 
High personal 
income 
1=respondent has high 
income, zero otherwise 
.29 .45 232,960 1999-
2003 
More than one 
owner 
1=start-up has more 
than one owner, zero 
otherwise 
.44 .50 18,828 2000-
2003 
Growth 
Aspirations 
1=start-up expects to 
create more than one 
job in 5 yrs  
.54 .50 20,621 1999-
2003 
Measures of macroeconomic development 
GDP per capita GDP per capita at 
purchasing power 
parity, constant at 2000 
$USD (WB WDI 2008) 
23,158.79 8,310.30 358,278 1998-
2003 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth 
rate (WB WDI 2008) 
2.52 2.54 358,278 1998-
2003 
Source: GEM 1998-2003 unless specified otherwise 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics and definitions of dependent variables 
Variable Definition Mean S.D. No of obs Available 
for years 
Nascent 
entrepreneurship 
1=respondent is 
engaged in startup 
activity, zero if not 
.034 .18 342,839 2000-2003 
External finance 1=startup turns to 
external finance 
.53 .50 6,600 2002-2003 
Share of external 
funds 
Share of external 
funds in total startup 
funds 
.33 .35 6,600 2002-2003 
Own funds  Volume of own funds 
scaled down by GDP 
pc 
37.96 872.36 6,903 2002-2003 
Total funds Volume of total funds 
scaled down by GDP 
pc 
51.43 804.67 7432 2002-2003 
Individuals’ funding 1=startup received 
external funding from 
individuals (friends, 
colleagues and 
family), 0 otherwise 
.61 .49 5,588 2003 
Institutional 
funding 
1=startup received 
external institutional 
funding, inc. bank 
.44 .50 5,588 2003 
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finance, 0 otherwise 
External funding 
outside family  
1= startup received 
money outside family 
(individuals who are 
not relatives & 
institutions), 0 
otherwise 
.71 .45 5,588 2003 
Source: GEM 1998-2003 unless specified otherwise 
 
Table 3: Correlation matrix for institutional and macroeconomic variables 
 
 Property 
rights 
Business 
constraints 
Formal 
finance 
as % of 
GDP 
Informal 
finance 
prevalence 
Financial 
regulation 
GDP 
per 
capita 
GDP 
growth 
Property 
rights 
1.00       
Business 
constraints 
-.59 1.00      
Formal 
finance as 
% of GDP 
.52 -.49 1.00     
Informal 
finance 
prevalence 
.12 .12 .12 1.00    
Financial 
restrictions 
-.55 .71 -.49 .16 1.00   
GDP per 
capita 
.76 -.61 .60 .04 -.62 1.00  
GDP 
growth 
-.10 .05 -.00 .12 .23 -.15 1.00 
 
Source: GEM 1998-2003  
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Table 4: Probit estimation results and marginal effects 
 
probit results probit marginal effects dependent: 
Use of 
External finance 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. Coef. Robust Std. Err. 
Age -0.027a 0.008 -0.011a 0.003
Age squared 0.000b 0.000 0.000a 0.000
Male 0.120b 0.051 0.048b 0.020
Employment 0.060 0.069 0.024 0.027
Post-secondary & 
higher education -0.146d 0.086 -0.058 0.034
Higher education 0.009 0.057 0.003 0.023
Current owner of 
business 0.110 0.106 0.043 0.041
Business angel -0.011 0.081 -0.004 0.032
Fear of failure 0.126d 0.071 0.049d 0.028
Knows other 
entrepreneur 0.110 0.805 0.043 0.032
Opportunity 
motivation -0.051 0.062 -0.020 0.024
High personal 
income 0.116c 0.052 0.046c 0.020
More than one 
owner 0.951a 0.084 0.364a 0.030
Growth Aspirations 0.389a 0.069 0.154a 0.027
Informal finance 
prevalence 0.052b 0.021 0.021a 0.008
Formal 
finance/GDP -0.001d 0.001 -0.001d 0.000
Financial 
restrictions 0.603c 0.218 0.239b 0.087
Financial 
restrictions 
squared -0.255b 0.081 -0.101b 0.002
Property rights 0.073a 0.016 0.029a 0.006
GDP per capita -0.013 0.012 -0.005 0.005
GDP growth 1.63E-06 4.79E-06 6.46E-07 1.90E-06
Constant -0.867 0.280   
Number of obs 3019 3019 
Wald chi2 (21) 596.93 596.93 
Pseudo R2 0.154 .154 
 
Note: a significant at 0.001; b significant at 0.01; c significant at 0.05;d significant at 0.1. For non-
linear variables, including Age and Financial restrictions, marginal effects are different from the 
ones reported in the table. For further discussion of marginal effects for Financial restrictions see 
section 4. 
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Table 5: Tobit estimation results 
 
Share of external funds Explanatory variables 
 
 
Coef. Robust Std. Err. 
Age -0.010a 0.003
Age squared 0.000b 0.000
Male 0.074b 0.024
Employment 0.025 0.033
Post-secondary & higher 
education -0.055 0.039
Higher education 0.008 0.024
Current owner of business 0.053 0.048
Business angel 0.003 0.030
Fear of failure 0.040 0.029
Knows other entrepreneur 0.040 0.038
Opportunity motivation -0.027 0.026
High personal income 0.042d 0.023
More than one owner 0.418a 0.039
Growth aspirations 0.203a 0.035
Informal finance 
prevalence 0.025a 0.007
Formal finance/GDP -0.001d 0.000
Financial restrictions 0.230c 0.089
Financial restrictions 
squared -0.102b 0.036
Property rights 0.029a 0.008
GDP per capita -0.004 0.006
GDP growth 2.85e-06 2.14e-06
Constant -0.398 0.105
Number of left-censored 
obs 
1399 
Number of uncensored 
obs. 
1620 
Sigma  0.521 .024 
F (21, 2998) 35.79 
Pseudo R2 0.126 
 
Note: a significant at 0.001; b significant at 0.01; c significant at 0.05;d significant at 0.1 
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Table 6: Robust regression results 
 
Total funds Own funds Explanatory variables 
 Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Age 0.018a 0.008 0.013a 0.004 
Age squared -0.000d 0.000 -0.000c 0.000 
Male 0.245a 0.043 0.120a 0.023 
Employment 0.067 0.052 0.039 0.028 
Post-secondary & 
higher education -0.048 0.057 0.038 0.024 
Higher education -0.049 0.046 -0.063b 0.024 
Current owner of 
business 0.050 0.073 0.016 0.038 
Business angel 0.327a 0.064 0.127a 0.034 
Fear of failure -0.046 0.062 -0.026 0.033 
Knows other 
entrepreneur 0.055 0.044 0.040d 0.023 
Opportunity motivation 0.146b 0.051 0.096a 0.027 
High personal income 0.184a 0.042 0.075a 0.022 
More than one owner 0.184a 0.040 0.035 0.021 
Growth Aspirations 0.422a 0.061 0.194a 0.033 
Informal finance 
prevalence -0.007 0.009 -0.012b 0.005 
Formal finance/GDP 0.001d 0.001 0.001b 0.000 
Financial restrictions 0.410b 0.133 0.129d 0.071 
Financial restrictions 
squared -0.039 0.057 -0.005 0.030 
Property rights 0.033a 0.009 0.007 0.005 
GDP per capita 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.004 
GDP growth -0.000 4.17e-06 -0.000a 2.24e-06 
Constant -0.589 0.202 -0.235 0.106 
Number of obs 3280 3130 
F st. 17.19 13.41 
 
Note: a significant at 0.001; b significant at 0.01; c significant at 0.05;d significant at 0.1 
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Table 7: Bivariate probit regression results 
 
Individuals’ funding Institutional finance Explanatory 
variables 
 
Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Age -0.021 0.014 -0.001 0.011 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Male 0.113 0.077 0.193b 0.066 
Employment 0.041 0.086 -0.035 0.082 
Post-secondary & 
higher education -0.001 0.096 0.212b 0.073 
Current owner of 
business -0.111 0.102 -0.048 0.084 
Business angel -0.014 0.091 0.032 0.076 
Knows other 
entrepreneur 0.058 0.076 0.035 0.064 
Opportunity 
motivation -0.019 0.053 0.013 0.081 
High personal 
income 0.116d 0.060 -0.087 0.071 
More than one 
owner 0.270b 0.092 -0.010 0.055 
Growth aspirations 0.253b 0.084 0.095 0.093 
Property rights -0.259 0.191 0.512b 0.163 
Formal 
finance/GDP 0.003d 0.001 -0.003b 0.001 
Informal finance 
prevalence 0.011 0.014 -0.025 0.019 
GDP growth 0.014 0.029 0.015 0.032 
Constant 0.175 0.344 -0.429 0.328 
Number of obs 2299 
Wald chi2 (32) 1280.7  
P-value=0.000 
 
Note: a significant at 0.001; b significant at 0.01; c significant at 0.05;d significant at 0.1 
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Table 8: Probit marginal effects: types of external financing  
 
Institutional 
finance 
External funding outside 
family  
Explanatory 
variables 
 Coef. Robust 
Std. Err. 
Coef. Robust Std. 
Err. 
Age -0.000 0.004 0.002 0.005 
Age squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
Male 0.077b 0.026 0.143a 0.022 
Employment -0.014 0.033 -0.006 0.032 
Post-secondary & 
higher education 0.083b 0.029 0.078c 0.033 
Current owner of 
business -0.018 0.033 -0.002 0.301 
Business angel 0.013 0.030 0.000 0.022 
Knows other 
entrepreneur 0.014 0.025 0.015 0.019 
Opportunity 
motivation 0.006 0.032 0.004 0.033 
High personal 
income -0.034 0.028 0.026 0.019 
More than one 
owner -0.004 0.022 0.087b 0.002 
Growth aspirations 0.037 0.037 0.103b 0.040 
Property rights 0.199b 0.060 0.138c 0.062 
Formal 
finance/GDP -0.001b 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Informal finance 
prevalence -0.010 0.008 -0.001 0.007 
GDP growth 0.006 0.013 0.018d 0.010 
No. of obs 2299 2299 
Wald chi2  42.80 218.48 
Pseudo R2 0.030 0.094 
 
Note: a significant at 0.001; b significant at 0.01; c significant at 0.05;d significant at 0.1 
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